The purpose of this article is to place into dialogue the paths indicated by Bakhtin and Heidegger that lead to the understanding and interpretation of the event of being in language. Thus, we analyzed the philosophers' common proposal for establishing a first philosophy (prima philosophia), which questions the origin of meaning. This is equivalent to inquiring about the access to reality that every language and thus every discourse/text/utterance provide. We also examined the ontological character of Dasein (being-there) and the role of thinking for the interpretation of the ethical act materialized in the event of being. In order to lay the theoretical foundation of the paths of an architectonics and hermeneutics of ontological facticity, Bakhtin and Heidegger, respectively, revisited several traditions. What would the role left to philosophy be in understanding and interpreting the event of being? The answer to this question seems to point to an ontological-hermeneutic understanding/interpretation whose paths we attempted to unveil. 
The present study is part of the ongoing research project called The Origins of Bakhtin's Ethical Philosophy of Language: Rereading Metaphysics and OntologicalHermeneutic Phenomenology. In this project we seek to understand the philosophical foundation of the Dialogical Theory, which is a theoretical and methodological source for studies based on the Dialogical Discourse Analysis (DDA) as well as a theoretical and practical basis of an ethical philosophy of language for an enunciative-discursive semantics.
From this perspective, we aim to place into dialogue the paths that Bakhtin and Heidegger indicated for the understanding and interpretation of the event of being in language. This indication is found in the ethical-philosophical foundation of their work, specifically in Toward a Philosophy of the Act (BAKHTIN, 1993 (BAKHTIN, [1920 ), 1 Being and Time (HEIDEGGER, 1962 (HEIDEGGER, [1927 ), 2 On the Way to Language (HEIDEGGER, 1971a (HEIDEGGER, [1959 ), 3 Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event) (HEIDEGGER, 2012 (HEIDEGGER, [1936 ), 4 Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity (HEIDEGGER, 1999 (HEIDEGGER, [1923 ), 5 On Time and Being (HEIDEGGER, 1972 (HEIDEGGER, [1969 ), 6 and Letter on Humanism (HEIDEGGER, 1993 (HEIDEGGER, [1947 ).
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In order to achieve our objectives, we chose to discuss two themes that stand out in the aforementioned works, viz., thinking and language, and the event of being.
The Path in Search of a First Philosophy (Prima Philosophia)
In the essay Para uma filosofia do ato: válido e inserido no contexto [Toward a Philosophy of the Act: Valid and Contextulized], Amorim (2009, p.20) Bakhtin (1993) 11 weaves a conceptual network on life, art, and science, which integrates ethical, aesthetic and cognoscitive dimensions and introduces the ethical category of answerability.
In this context, we have to consider both philosophers' proposal to establish a first philosophy (prima philosophia). This means that they wanted Philosophy to recover its original vocation, which is, from the perspective of historicity, to think the truth of being as an event. That is equivalent to reconsidering the question of the origin of meaning and of the access to reality that every language and thus every discourse/text/utterance provide. According to Bakhtin and Heidegger, respectively, [h]ence it should be clear that a first philosophy, which attempts to describe Being-as-event as it is known to the answerable act or deed, attempts to describe not the world produced by that act, but the world in which that act becomes answerably aware of itself and is actually performed -that a first philosophy of such a kind cannot proceed by constructing universal concepts, propositions, and laws about this world of the answerably performed act (the theoretical, abstract purity of the act), but can only be a description, a phenomenology of that world.
[…] the performed act sees more than just a unitary context; it also sees a unique, concrete context, an ultimate context, into which it refers both its own sense and its own factuality, and within which it attempts to actualize answerably the unique truth [pravda] of both the fact and the sense in their concrete unity (BAKHTIN, 1993, pp.31-32;  28; emphasis in original).
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The question of "meaning," i. […] Thinking of beyng as event is inceptual thinking, which prepares the other beginning by confronting the first one (HEIDEGGER, 2012, pp.4; 11; 24-26 Now, if the understanding of the truth of being (BAKHTIN, 1993; 14 HEIDEGGER, 2012) 15 must be found in the event of being in life, we need to reflect upon the way it comes into existence. In this sense, Bakhtin (1993) 16 proposes the idea of a concrete architectonic of the actual world of the performed act or deed, arranged around values. He then compares it with the architectonic of the world in aesthetic seeing, showing some characteristics they share. For Bakhtin (1993, p.54) , 17 if the event of being is composed of "common moments or constituents in their various concrete architectonics,"
[i]t is this concrete architectonic of the actual world of the performed act that moral philosophy has to describe, that is, not the abstract scheme but the concrete plan or design of the world of a unitary and once-occurrent act or deed, the basic concrete moments of its construction and their mutual disposition. These basic moments are Ifor-myself, the other-for-me, and I-for-the-other.
He then states that every value of real life and culture is "arranged around the basic architectonic points of the actual world of the performed act or deed: scientific values, aesthetic values, political values (including both ethical and social values), and, finally, religious values" (BAKTIN, 1993, p.54) .
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As to Heidegger (1972) , 19 in his work On Time and Being, he poses the question of the task still reserved to thinking at the end of philosophy and reflects upon the way being appears into existence. He uses the metaphor of the clearing, an open space that is free for brightness and darkness, for resonance and echo, to illustrate that truth can only present itself [appear] , that is, be brought into existence through the clearing that is opened and made possible by being. The task of thinking is to bring being into existence, for it is through thinking that being is drawn close to the clearing:
The end of philosophy is the place, that place in which the whole of philosophy's history is gathered in its most extreme possibility [. Heidegger's (1972) 22 reference to the metaphor of the clearing and to the role of thinking (so it can listen to Being) allows us to associate the image of a forest with human existence, which, similarly to the forest, offers different possible paths to reach the clearing. In this sense, the path that Heidegger suggests is the Analytic of Dasein (being-there), which lays its foundation in the question of being, in the way being is present in human existence. It thus differs radically from the ontic determinations of entity, which, in science, are called categories. As to Bakhitn (1993) , 23 the path to reach the event can only be in the concrete plane of the world of the act, which is unique and singular. Its moments are set in a relation of otherness, between I and the Other, and presuppose the ethic and aesthetic planes, which includes the plane of cognition. In these planes we find all the values of real life and culture.
It is possible to conclude that both philosophers made considerations of a historical and philosophical nature in favor of a first philosophy (prima philosophia).
They thus privileged the ontological character of being, which can only be found in existence and in the concrete world of the act, and the role of thinking in understanding and interpreting the event of being.
From this perspective, the task of thinking being is necessarily connected to language: If it is through language that the event of being happens, to investigate it is to try to understand the very opening of Being in the world. In the following section, we will discuss Bakhtin's and Heidegger's thought on language as a thinking experience. The second premise seems to indicate that language is in the closest vicinity to human beings, for in language man finds the dwelling of his own presence in the word. Bakhtin (1993) 26 agrees with that by stating that participative thinking is done in the concrete architectonic of the world of the performed act, which cannot be defined based on categories of an indifferent theoretical consciousness: The word is the way to dwell in 27 and to express the life of the ethical act and the unique event of being.
Thus, what does it mean to deal with language thinkingly? Metaphysics is based on the entity model, understood as a simple presence. It considers only that which every entity has in common. Thinking, on the other hand, does not move directly towards where man is; it moves towards where being is: thinking is the thinking of being. It understands being (HEIDEGGER, 1993 (HEIDEGGER, [1962 28 ). 29 Therefore, it is possible to realize that one of the means by which thinking is done is through presence. Thinking only moves forward because of its presence and its questioning. Thus, it is necessary to question, for this questioning is the theme that will help us find the path, the path of being-in-the-world. It is paved by questions and answers, which open clearings that here and there grant us greater freedom. This freedom is the questioning of thinking.
The task of thinking must accompany Philosophy. Heidegger (1972) singleness, and simplicity in order to seek multiplicity and variety. Because sameness is fragile, it is necessary to look for creative thinking. In this sense, we realize that creative events are permeated by language, which is the basic condition of thinking.
As to Bakhtin, the value of the knowledge (content) produced by theory (abstract cognition) is different from the content produced by living experiences: the former corresponds to a given, presumed value whereas the latter corresponds to an affirmed value of those who think in an emotional-volitional tone. authentic hearing holds back with its own saying" (HEIDEGGER, 1971b, pp.206, 207) . 34 In Bakhtin (1993, p.32, 33) , 35 in turn, the living word, the whole word, "does not merely designate an object as a present-on-hand entity," but expresses our valuative attitude toward it, setting "in motion toward that which is yet-to-be-determined about it." Thus, having a language experience seems to be very different from acquiring linguistic knowledge about a language through Linguistics, Philology, or Psychology.
According to Heidegger (1971a, p.30 Holquist (1993) , 40 this discussion gives way to the notion of dialogism, which will be developed in later works.
We can state that in science the path to knowledge is subject to method and the path to the thinking experience with language presupposes listening to the word that comes towards us, in its vigorous essence, as the saga of "Saying" (HEIDEGGER, 1971a, p.47) 41 and of the answerable act (BAKHTIN, 1993) . 42 In order to do that, we need to quit the habit of only listening to what we already understand.
Listening to Language as Path and Opening
If it is through language, speech, that being is presented in the world and shares experiences with others, what we are interested in knowing is: How do we authentically listen to language?
As we have mentioned before, according to Bakhtin (1993) 43 and Heidegger (1999) , 44 this has to do with a new way of thinking, one that comes towards being and moves in an opening. It also refers to the commitment of radically adopting its historicity, i.e., being, in the event, in the uniqueness of event. Besides, we need to take into account that both philosophers believe that language possesses given meanings and structures, with which we enter into contact with beings in the world. However, these structures do not yet represent an articulation of Mitsein (being-with), nor do they constitute an experience of reality.
For us to discuss listening to language, we must think in terms of encounter and opening. Here encounter is not understood as the movement towards the object itself, which would be related to the notion of word as instrument, by means of which we came into the world. Besides, opening does not mean total explicitation; rather, it means opening to the being that is revealed in speech, sheltering it and responding to its appeal. can say that the authentic hearing of the word that comes towards us is a fundamental part of the path of the thinking experience with language.
Paths to the Event of Being
Bakhtin ( Averintesev writes the following footnote to this passage:
In this footnote we observe Averintesev's effort to make clear the meaning of the Russian expression sobytie bytiia in Toward a Philosophy of the Act: "the ongoing event of Being," "Being-as-event." He thus confirms its affiliation with Phenomenology and finds, in Art and Answerability (BAKHTIN, 1990) , 47 the evidence that in fact this relationship is firmly grounded insofar as the event refers to the notion of a living consciousness as an event, which lives in it and is actively oriented.
There is another footnote that clarifies the meaning of the expression moral answerability and its philosophical affiliation. It is found in the Spanish version of
Toward a Philosophy of the Act, which was translated from Russian into Spanish as
Hacia una filosofía del acto ético (BAKHTIN, 1997a) 48 by Tatiana Bubnova. The footnote refers to the passage in which Bakhtin refers to the projection of the act as a two-faced Janus, which looks at the objective unity of the domain of culture and at the unrepeatable uniqueness of lived life:
It is only the once-occurrent event of Being in the process of actualization that can constitute this unique unity; all that which is theoretical or aesthetic must be determined as a constituent moment in the once-occurrent event of Being, although no longer, of course, in theoretical or aesthetic terms. An act must acquire a single unitary plane to be able to reflect itself in both directions -in its sense or meaning and in its being; it must acquire the unity of two-sided answerability -both for its content (special answerability) and for its Being (moral answerability). And the special answerability, moreover, must be brought into communion with the unitary and unique moral answerability as a constituent moment in it. That is the only way whereby the pernicious non-fusion and non-interpenetration of culture and life could be surmounted (1993, pp.2-3).
In footnote 1 (BAKHTIN, 1997a, p.8), Tatiana Bubnova explains the meaning of moral answerability, stating that
[e]vidently here he refers to ontological answerability, which is inherent to the very fact of being, for being (bytie) in its eventness (sobytie) is but "being together," the I and the Other. Being in the world is a commitment.
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In this case, for Bubnova, moral answerability refers to the Ontological tradition (ontological answerability). Now, in classical tradition, Ontology is the doctrine of being as such in its general determinations. In its modern usage, Ontology is employed as a theory of a formal nature, applied to the objectivity of an entity. It may either coincide with Ancient Ontology (Metaphysics) or relate to Phenomenology in its strict sense, limited to living experiences (HEIDEGGER, 1999) . 50 However, Heidegger observes that the inadequacy of traditional and modern Ontologies is twofold, for being applied to being-an-object and to "an indifferent theoretical meaning" (p.2), they end up blocking access to entity, which is decisive within philosophical problems of Dasein (being-there):
[...] an indifferent theoretical meaning, or a material being-an-object for the particular sciences of nature and culture concerned with it, and by means of the regions of objects -should the need arise -the world, but not as it is from out of its being-there for Dasein and the possibilities of this being-there […] What results from this: it blocks access to that being [Seienden] which is decisive within philosophical problems: namely, Dasein, from out of which and for the sake of which, philosophy "is" (1999, p.2).
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The result of this point of view is that the term Ontology will not suffice for the understanding of the event of being, for any questioning and investigating will only be directed to being-an-object.
However, when Bubnova gives the word event a moral value, stemming from its inherent answerability, in its eventness, which is but being together, the I and the Other, she does not refer to that being-an-object that coincides with the entity. Therefore, it is not possible to give Ontology a general meaning, nor limit Phenomenology to living experiences anymore.
Further on, Bakhtin (1993) 52 makes it clear that "this world-as-event is not just a world of being, of that which is given: no object, no relation is given here […] as something totally on hand, but is always given in conjunction with another given" (p.32). As it is not possible to be conscious of an indifferent and finished object, "[p]ure
givenness cannot be experienced actually" (p.32). Thus, when we experience an object -even if we do so by thinking of it -"it becomes a changing moment in the ongoing event of my experiencing (thinking) it, i.e., it assumes the character of something-yetto-be achieved" (p.32). This means that it is made known "within a certain event unity," performed act (and everything is an act or deed that I perform -even thought and feeling); it is a certain attitude of consciousness, the structure of which we intend to disclose phenomenologically" (p.6).
Referring to Kant's The Critique of Pure Reason, Bakhtin observes that "[t]he discovery of an a priori element in our cognition" did not open a way out to a "historically individual, actual cognitional act"; hence, for this transcendent activity, "one was compelled to think up a purely theoretical subjectum […], a historically nonactual subjectum -a universal consciousness, a scientific consciousness, an epistemological subjectum" (1993, p.6) . 56 In a footnote, Bubnova (BAJTIN, 1997a, p.13 ) explained that when Bakhtin wrote "a historically non-actual subjectum," he used the word istoricheskii (historical), which in this context is not commonly used in Russian. It is used here as an expression that is close to sobytiinyi (eventness/with characteristics of an event) and reminds us of the German word geschitlich, which is an important term in German Philosophy that semantically differs from historisch.
Heidegger and his followers use the latter term as an antonym of geschitlich. Bubnova also observes that for Bakhtin's German contemporaries, Geschichte means "the stream of events that are concretely existential, irreversible, and unrepeatable; it is different from the systematized Historie" (BAJTIN, 1997a, p.13) .
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On the linguistic plane, the examples we have discussed help us to retrieve the more original meaning (as Heidegger would put it) of key ideas in Bakhtin's philosophy, such as unrepeatable uniqueness of lived life, moral answerability, onceoccurrent event of Being, veridicality as the ought-to-be act of thinking and, more importantly, his affiliation to philosophical traditions. It is at this point that reading
Heidegger is always enlightening, for as Bakhtin establishes his point of view, he does it by thoroughly retrieving and questioning the philosophical traditions that nurtured him -from Metaphysics, Ontology, and Phenomenology to Hermeneutics.
An Attempt towards Final Remarks: Open Paths to the Clearing of Being
This reflection is far from wearing out the complexity of the theme we have proposed. Our intent was to shed some light onto a few philosophical fundamentals that point to the ontological-hermeneutic dimension of Bakhtin's and Heidegger's thinking on language and on the event of being/Dasein (being-there). It is ontological because the understanding (meaning) of human existence is necessarily associated to the historical opening that only being, as an event and a project of ought-to-be in the actually lived and experienced life, can grant to entity: being is existence. It is also hermeneutic because the understanding (meaning) of the answerable act and of Dasein (being-there), in the event of being-in-the-world, is necessarily associated to a different kind of understanding. This understanding is not reduced nor is it confounded to a simple explanation that we can find in a general founding system governed by reason, as are the rational methods of (founding and explaining) science. Having a hermeneutical experience is not remaining with a pre-conception of the world, which is already given, explained, and whose meaning is stable. The intended understanding is that which can only be found in the answerably performed act and in the facticity of Dasein (being-there). In other words, it is that whose understanding life itself gives in a world that has an emotional/affectionate-volitional tone.
As we can see, Bakhtin and Heidegger summon us to tread the path of language in the event of being. Thus, we have to go beyond the relationship between thing and word in order to find being and saying. In other words, "language is the guardian of the being of things, as presence, and of the mode of event occurrence insofar as it circumscribes the field of our possible experiences in the world" (SAMPAIO, 2013, p.5).
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Therefore, we can say that being is the beginning, the opening to the world. On the other hand, we also understand that entity is simple presence, that which is susceptible to be known, manipulated, or transformed. Thus, looking at being (and not at entity) allows for a thinking experience with language and gives a new meaning to investigations that attempt to observe its phenomena. We must also rethink how we should approach these phenomena by keeping an eye on what is being said, keeping the room of the unsaid, and sheltering speech as it is revealed as such (not as we would like it to be or as we want to understand it).
We must also consider each experience as unique: it belongs to a historical community that lives in language. It is only from this unique place that we can find the nexuses, the echoes that resonate in countless connections. We need to prioritize the exercise of careful listening, for it is only through it that we can reach the being that enunciates. This makes it possible for our saying to be transformed and to unveil the knowledge that opens the clearing. In this sense, we can state, with Heidegger (1962), 59 that the presence of being-in-the-world is enunciated in speech. It is this presence that makes the articulation of comprehensibility possible, which is the reason why speech is on the basis of the interpretation of every utterance.
To conclude, we can say that as we are faced with the understanding and the interpretation of the event of being in language, we are summoned to seek the clearing by our moral answerability for thinking and for participatory ethical acts. The privileged paths to this search for knowledge, as suggested by Bakhtin and Heidegger, are of interest to every single one who intends to go beyond the logical system of natural languages, for if it is only through language that we can reach the event of being, investigating it means seeking to understand how the very opening of being-in-theworld occurs.
